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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS FRANCIS, 
GAMMETT, AND PROVO OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY CLINIC 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(3) (i) (1987). The trial court granted defen-
dants1 Motions for Summary Judgment, the Order of Dismissal was 
entered on August 18, 1988 (R. 223-225). Plaintiff filed her 
Notice of Appeal on August 30, 1988 (R. 228-229). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was plaintiff required to obtain competent expert 
testimony to establish the standard of care, the breach of the 
standard of care, and causation in order to make a prima facie 
case of medical malpractice under the circumstances of this 
case. 
2. Were the circumstances of plaintiff's medical 
treatments, and the burn to plaintiff's leg the type of situa-
tion involving medical procedures within the common knowledge of 
laymen, thus alleviating the need for expert testimony on the 
issue of negligence. 
3. Was the trial court correct in its ruling that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to the circum-
stances of this case and that plaintiff's reliance on the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur and/or the "Nixdorf exception" was 
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insufficient in the absence of expert testimony on the issue of 
causation. 
4. Is this Court's holding in Johnson v. Rogers, 763 
P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) on the issue of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress retroactive and, therefore, applicable to 
plaintifffs claim. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This case involves claims of medical malpractice 
against the defendant health care providers wherein plaintiff 
alleges physical injuries and mental anguish. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
On January 28, 1987, plaintiff filed her Complaint 
against the defendant health care providers, alleging medical 
malpractice and seeking damages. (R. 1-3). 
On April 13, 1988, defendant James T. Southwick, M.D. 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 69-71). 
On May 23, 1988, defendants Howard R. Francis, M.D., 
Kent R. Gammett, M.D., and Provo Obstetrics and Gynecology Clin-
ic filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 100-102). 
On June 10, 1988, defendant Utah Valley Regional Medi-
cal Center, IHC Hospitals, Inc. dba Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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The Motion for Summary Judgment of these respondents, 
Dr. Francis, Dr. Gammett, and Provo Obstetrics and Gynecology 
Clinic, was based upon the following: 
(a) Plaintifffs failure to provide expert testimony 
on the issue of the standard of care applicable to these respon-
dents, the breach of said standard of care, and that said breach 
proximately caused plaintifffs damages. 
(b) That plaintifffs injury and alleged damages are 
not of the type that are within the common knowledge of the 
layman and that, therefore, expert testimony is required. 
(c) That plaintiff's reliance on res ipsa loquitur or 
on Nixdorf, infra, does not alleviate the requirement of expert 
testimony on the issue of causation. 
On June 14, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine 
seeking a determination by the trial court that plaintiff's 
injury was of the type which does not occur in the absence of 
negligence and that expert testimony was, therefore, unneces-
sary. (R. 172-173). 
All of the Motions were argued before the trial court 
on July 22, 1988. (R. 232-233). On August 1, 1988, the trial 
court issued a ruling granting all of the defendants' Motions 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 219-221; copy attached as Addendum 
No. 1). 
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The Court's Order granting the defendants1 Motions for 
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff1s Motion in Limine was 
entered on August 18, 1988. (R. 223-225; copy attached as Ad-
dendum No. 2). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. February 5, 1985—Plaintiff Jeanna Dalley under-
went an elective Caesarean Section at Utah Valley Hospital, 
performed by Dr. Francis and assisted by Dr. Gammett. (R. 1-3). 
2. On February 6, 1985, Dr. Francis observed a burn 
on Jeanna Dalley's leg and made the following notation on the 
hospital chart: 
Does have what appears to be a 4-5 day old 
burn rt. calf—pt. did not know about it. 
It is asymptomatic. 
(R. 114). 
3. Plaintiff alleges that the burn took place in the 
operating room, that she has suffered physical and emotional 
damages as a result of said burn, and that the defendant health 
care providers are liable for her damages. (R. 1-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, in order to make a prima facie case in 
a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must present expert 
testimony as to the standard of care of the defendant health 
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care provider, that the standard of care was breached, and that 
said breach proximately caused plaintiff's injuries and damages. 
Expert testimony is required because the nature of the medical 
treatment and circumstances surrounding said treatment are of 
the type not within the general knowledge and understanding of 
the average juror. Plaintiff failed and refused to provide any 
expert testimony in support of her claims. 
The exception to the above-stated rule of law, as 
found in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), that ex-
pert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care 
where the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of a layman, (hereafter termed 
the "Nixdorf exception") is not applicable to the circumstances 
surrounding plaintifffs claims. 
Even if this Court finds that the "Nixdorf exception" 
does apply to the circumstances surrounding plaintifffs injury, 
plaintiff must still produce expert testimony on the issue of 
causation. Plaintiff failed and refused to do so, and Summary 
Judgment was appropriately granted. 
Plaintiff's reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur in support of her claim that expert testimony is not 
necessary is likewise misplaced. Even if res ipsa loquitur 
applies to the circumstances of this case, plaintiff must still 
produce expert testimony on the issue of causation. Plaintiff 
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failed and refused to do so, and summary judgment was appropri-
ately granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAKE A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE WITHOUT 
COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT DR. 
FRANCIS AND/OR DR. GAMMETT BREACHED 
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE. 
The law in Utah is that in order to make a prima facie 
case in a medical malpractice lawsuit, a plaintiff must present 
competent evidence by way of expert testimony establishing both 
the standard of care ordinarily exercised by other practitioners 
in the defendant's field of practice, and that the defendant 
departed from that applicable standard of care, and that said 
breach proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. 
As to the requirement of expert testimony, this Court, 
in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351-352 (Utah 1980), held: 
In malpractice actions, generally the physi-
cian is held to the standard of skill em-
ployed by his contemporary in the same or 
similar communities. Therefore, before the 
plaintiff can prevail in a medical malprac-
tice action, he must establish both a stan-
dard of care required of the defendant as a 
practicing physician in the community and 
the defendant's failure to employ that stan-
dard. 
In the majority of medical malpractice 
cases, the plaintiff must introduce expert 
testimony to establish the standard of care. 
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Expert testimony is required because the 
nature of the profession removes the par-
ticularities of its practice from the knowl-
edge and understanding of the average citi-
zen . 
See also, Malmstrom v. Olsen, 400 P.2d (Utah 1965); Kim v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980); Jennings v. Stoker, 652 
P.2d 912 (Utah 1982); and, Farrow v. Health Services Corp,, 604 
P.2d 474 (Utah 1970). 
On February 24, 1987, Dr. Francis and Dr. Gammett 
served Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
upon plaintiff requesting, inter alia, the names, addresses, and 
qualifications of each person whom plaintiff intends to call as 
an expert witness to testify against Dr. Francis and/or Dr. 
Gammett at trial. 
In plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories dated April 
24, 1987, plaintiff identified Blaine L. Hirshe, M.D. as an 
expert. However, plaintiff stated that Dr. Hirshe is in actu-
ality a factual witness and will not testify in a "expert" ca-
pacity against Dr. Francis and/or Dr. Gammett, but that his 
testimony would be limited to "treatment of the plaintiff, in-
volving skin graft surgery." Plaintiff further states in her 
Answers to Interrogatories: "Other experts who may be called to 
testify are unknown at this time." Plaintiff has failed to 
produce any expert testimony imputing any negligence or other 
fault to Dr. Gammett or Dr. Francis, or any testimony as to 
causation of plaintiff's injury. 
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At the time the defendants1 Motions for Summary Judg-
ment were argued before the trial court, there was a total ab-
sence in the record of any expert testimony imputing negligence 
on the part of Dr. Francis and/or Dr. Gammett. All references 
as to these defendants1 treatment of the plaintiff, and all 
evidence before the Court at the time the Motions for Summary 
Judgment were argued, was that Dr. Francis and Dr. Gammett did 
not deviate from the standard of care. 
Dr. Francis filed an Affidavit (R. 114), which states, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
On February 5, 1985, I performed an elective 
low-transverse cervical Caesarean Section on 
Jeanna Dalley at Utah Valley Regional Medi-
cal Center. 
4. On February 6, 1985, I observed the burn 
on Jeanna Dalleyfs leg and made the follow-
ing note on the hospital chart: 
"Does have what appears to be a 4-5 
day old burn rt. calf—pt. did not 
know about it. It is asymptomatic." 
5. Based upon my observation of Jeanna 
Dalleyfs leg on February 6, 1985, it is ray 
belief that the burn was incurred by her 
prior to her admission to the hospital. 
6. I am not aware of any instrumentality 
which was near the patient's legs during the 
time of the surgery in question that could 
have caused or resulted in the burn on the 
patient's lower right leg. 
7. From my review of the medical records 
and based upon ray experience and expertise 
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in the field of obstetrics and gynecology, 
it is my opinion that the medical treatment 
and care that I rendered to Jeanna M. Dally 
complied in all respects with the standard 
of professional care, learning, skill, and 
treatment ordinarily possessed and used by 
professionals in my field in good standing 
in this and similar communities in 1985. 
Dr. Gammett filed an Affidavit (R. 118), and stated, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
2. On February 5, 1985, I assisted in the 
performance of an elective low-transverse 
cervical Caesarean Section on Jeanna Dalley 
at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. 
4. I have no knowledge as to whether the 
burn on the patient's lower right leg was 
incurred prior to hospitalization. In addi-
tion, I have no knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that the burn was incurred during 
Jeanna Dalleyfs hospitalization. 
5. I am not aware of any instrumentality 
which was near the patient's legs during the 
time of the surgery in question that could 
have caused or resulted in the burn on the 
patient's lower right leg. 
6. From my review of the medical records, 
and based upon my experience and expertise 
in the field of obstetrics and gynecology, 
it is my opinion that the medical treatment 
and care that I rendered to Jeanna M. Dalley 
complied in all respects with the standard 
of professional care, learning, skill, and 
treatment ordinarily possessed and used by 
professionals in ray field in good standing 
in this and similar communities in 1985. 
The testimony of Dr. Gammett and Dr. Francis was and 
still remains unchallenged and uncontroverted. Plaintiff could 
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not rely on the mere allegations of her Complaint to controvert 
the Affidavits filed by Dr. Francis and Dr. Gammett. 
This Court, in Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co,, 537 
P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975), held: 
A party may not rely upon allegations in the 
pleadings to counter Affidavits made upon 
personal knowledge, stating facts contrary 
to the allegations of the pleadings. 
See also, Thornick v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); and Celo-
tex Corp. v. Cartrett, 106 Sup. Ct. 2548 (1986). 
The granting of Summary Judgment by the trial court 
was proper and should be affirmed. 
POINT II• 
THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AND 
DAMAGES ARE NOT OF THE TYPE WITHIN 
THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF LAYMEN. 
Plaintiff has alleged that under this Courtfs ruling 
in Nixdorf, supra, that her claim of sustaining a burn during 
surgery falls within the exception to the rule requiring expert 
testimony in medical malpractice cases. In Nixdorf, supra, this 
Court held: 
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish 
the standard of care owed to plaintiff where 
the propriety of the treatment received is 
within the common knowledge and experience 
of the layman. 
The defendant doctor in Nixdorf lost a cutting needle 
inside the plaintifffs body and failed to disclose this fact to 
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the plaintiff. This Court held that jurors could determine the 
standard of care that a physician was required to follow without 
expert testimony because it was within common knowledge that 
reasonable medical practitioners would not leave surgical in-
struments inside their patientfs bodies and keep it a secret. 
The Court held that expert testimony would shed little light on 
the "propriety of the treatment". (Nixdorf, supra, at 352-353). 
The circumstances of plaintiff's alleged injuries and 
damages, however, do not fall within the "Nixdorf exception". 
The record in this case is silent as to specifically how or why 
the plaintiff's burn occurred. It is unknown when the burn 
occurred. It is unknown what instrumentality, if any, caused 
the burn. It is unknown which of the defendants or other per-
sons who are not defendants had control of any instrumentality 
which may have caused the burn. The proceedings in a surgical 
operating room and the elective Caesarean surgery, and circum-
stances surrounding said surgery which plaintiff underwent at 
the time she alleges the burn occurred are all of the type and 
nature not within the general knowlege and understanding of a 
layman juror. 
Expert testimony was therefore necessary. Plaintiff 
produced no expert testimony and Summary Judgment was appropri-
ately granted by the trial court. 
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POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE "NIXDORF EXCEPTION" APPLIES 
TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PLAINTIFFS 
INJURIES, PLAINTIFF MUST STILL PRODUCE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION. 
Should this Court find that plaintifffs circumstances 
and her alleged injury and damages do fall within the "Nixdorf 
exception11 and that, therefore, expert testimony is not neces-
sary as to the issue of negligence, plaintiff is, nevertheless, 
required to produce expert testimony on the issue of causation. 
In plaintiff's Brief, plaintiff cites cases from North 
Carolina, Iowa, Wisconsin, New York, and Arizona, in support of 
her position. Plaintiff, however, ignores a recent holding by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, which clearly sets forth the rule of 
law that the plaintiff must produce expert testimony on the 
issue of causation, even if no expert testimony is needed on the 
issue of negligence. 
In Chadwick v. Nielsen, M.D., 763 P.2d 817, 821, 822 
(Utah App. 1988), the Court held: 
Due to the technical and complex nature of a 
medical doctor's services, expert medical 
testimony must be presented at trial in 
order to establish the standard of care and 
proximate cause—except in unusual circum-
stances. [Citations omitted]. For example: 
"Expert testimony is unnecessary to 
establish the standard of care owed 
the plaintiff where the propriety of 
the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of 
the layman." 
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Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980). 
Chadwick also misinterprets the scope of the 
Nixdorf exception. That exception expressly 
obviates the need for expert testimony only 
in establishing the standard of care and 
breach of that standard by the doctor. The 
medical malpractice plaintiff must still 
ord 
the 
doc 
inarily 
Nixdorf 
tor1 s 
provide ex 
1
 plaintiff, 
negligence 
pert 
, tO 
testimony 
establish 
proximately 
, as 
that 
did 
the 
caused 
plaintiff's injury, 
Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 354 N.17. See Anderson 
y. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 
(1943). In other words, while it may be 
common knowledge that a reasonable medical 
practitioner would not leave a needle in a 
patient's body, it requires expert testimony 
to establish that the lost needle is caus-
ing, for example, plaintiff's headaches. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Even if plaintiff is correct in her claim that the 
circumstances of her injuries and damages fall within the 
"Nixdorf exception" and that, therefore, expert testimony was 
unnecessary on the issue of the standard of care and the breach 
thereof, Utah law requires that plaintiff must nevertheless 
produce expert testimony on the issue of causation. Plaintiff 
failed to do so, and summary judgment was appropriately granted. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF MAY NOT RELY ON THE DOCTRINE 
OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN THE ABSENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION. 
It should first be noted that the defendants have 
alleged, and the trial court so ruled, that the doctrine of res 
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ipsa loquitur is inapplicable to the circumstances of plain-
tiffs case. In its ruling, the trial court stated: 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish 
sufficient foundation for the application of 
res ipsa loquitur and has failed to produce 
expert medical testimony, and since this is 
not an exceptional case, res ipsa loquitur 
does not apply... 
(R. 220-221; Addendum No. 1). 
Should this Court find that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is applicable to the circumstances of plaintiff's 
claim, plaintiff is, nevertheless, required to produce expert 
testimony on the issue of causation. 
In Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262 
(Utah App. 1987), the plaintiff underwent surgery for tonsilitis 
at LDS Hospital. As part of her treatment, she received three 
injections into her left hip. The day after surgery, the plain-
tiff experienced extreme pain and inflammation at the injection 
site and serious septic shock (bacterial poisoning of the 
blood), resulting in further surgery, removal of the infected 
hip tissue and muscle, and three weeks in the hospital recover-
ing from said infection and surgery. Robinson filed suit and 
the defendant health care providers subsequently filed Motions 
for Summary Judgment supported by Affidavits. Robinson did not 
file counter Affidavits opposing the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment; instead, relied on the doctine of res ipsa loquitur, 
claiming that under said doctrine, her case did not require 
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expert testimony to contradict the affidavits, and claiming, as 
does plaintiff herein, that her type of injury is the kind that 
a layman knew did not occur in the absence of negligence. 
The court in Robinson, supra, discussed the applica-
tion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as follows: 
In some exceptional circumstances, the 
plaintiff is permitted to use the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur to carry the burden of 
establishing these two elements, because 
expert testimony would add nothing to common 
knowledge that the injury was the result of 
negligence. The evidentiary doctrine estab-
lishes an inference of negligence from the 
circumstances incident to the medical treat-
ment. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d at 352. 
The loss of surgical instruments in pati-
ents, as in Nixdorf, is a classic example of 
those exceptional cases. 
The mere invocation of the doctrine, how-
ever, does not result in its automatic ap-
plication. In order to rely on res ipsa 
loquitur, the plaintiff must first establish 
a sufficient evidentiary foundation to sup-
port application of the doctrine and its 
inference of negligence. 
Generally, this requires the introduction of 
expert medical testimony to establish the 
fact that the outcome is more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. 
This testimony would be necessary to provide 
the evidentiary basis from which the jury 
could conclude the result is more probably 
than not due to the negligence of the at-
tending physician. 
The fact that plaintiff's disability result-
ed from an uncommon or rare occurrence does 
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not relieve him from the burden of estab-
lishing causation. An inference of negli-
gence cannot be permitted solely upon the 
basis that the plaintiff developed a rare 
complication while undergoing medical and 
surgical treatment • The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has no application unless it 
can be shown from past experience that the 
occurrence causing the disability is more 
likely the result of negligence than some 
other cause. 
The evidence in this case, even when viewed 
most favorably to Robinson, does not present 
sufficient foundation for the application of 
res ipsa loquitur. There is no expert tes-
timony in the record from which it could 
reasonably be concluded that Robinson's 
infection ordinarily would not happen in the 
absence of negligence. 
In order to create a genuine factual dispute 
on this point, Robinson thus had to come 
forward with evidence to counter Dr. Burke's 
Affidavit opinion—that non-negligent causes 
of her infection were probable—with expert 
testimony to the effect that Robinson's 
infection most likely resulted from negli-
gence, assuming it was possible to find an 
expert who could and would make such a 
statement. 
We agree the trial court should be extremely 
cautious in granting summary judgment for a 
defendant on the basis that plaintiff has 
failed to secure expert testimony to support 
a medical negligence action, but appellant 
contends that a plaintiff suing on a theory 
of res ipsa loquitur is always entitled to a 
trial on the merits so that summary judgment 
is always inappropriate. Such an argument 
miscomprehends the purpose and application 
of the doctrine as well as the pre-trial 
responsibilities of a plaintiff faced with a 
summary judgment motion.... 
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(Emphasis added). See also, Talbot v. Groves Latter-Day Saints 
Hosp., 21 Utah 2d 73 440 P.2d 872 (1968). 
Under Utah law, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of producing 
expert testimony as to the issue of causation. Without expert 
testimony, the jury, under the guise of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, and without any factual basis, would be forced to 
guess and speculate as to when the injury may have occurred, 
whether or not it was caused by an instrumentality that may have 
been under the exclusive control of any or all of the defen-
dants, and if so, which instrumentality and which defendant, 
etc. 
Utah law is clear. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
notwithstanding, the plaintiff must produce expert testimony on 
the issue of causation. Plaintiff failed to do so, and Summary 
Judgment was appropriately granted. 
?. 
THIS COURT'S RECENT RULING IN JOHNSON v. 
ROGERS, AS TO NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, IS NOT RETROACTIVE. 
Although these respondents respectfully submit that 
the matters discussed above, in support of affirmation of the 
trial courtfs granting of Summary Judgment, dispose of this 
matter in toto, it should be noted that plaintiff also claims 
-17-
that should this matter come to trial, plaintiff would be enti-
tled to proceed with the claim of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, based upon this Courtfs recent ruling in 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), wherein §313 of the 
Restatement (2d) of Torts was adopted. 
The courtfs holding in Johnson, supra, does not state 
that the new judicially-created and recognized tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, a matter substantive in na-
ture, is to be applied retroactively. Accordingly, the trial 
courtfs dismissal of plaintiff's claim for emotional distress, 
based upon the state of the law at such time, should also be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case of medical 
malpractice without obtaining competent expert testimony. 
Plaintiff failed and refused to obtain any expert testimony, and 
further failed to put forth any evidence contravening the Affi-
davits of Dr. Francis and Dr. Gammett. 
The circumstances of plaintiff's injury are not of the 
type which would fall within the "Nixdorf exception"; that is, 
the type of injury and circumstances surrounding the same, which 
are within the common knowledge and understanding of a lay jury. 
-18-
Even if this Court should find that the "Nixdorf ex-
ception" applies, thus alleviating plaintiff's need for expert 
testimony on the issue of negligence, expert testimony is still 
necessary on the issue of causation. 
Finally, should this Court find that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur applies to the circumstances of this case, 
expert testimony is again necessary as to the issue of causa-
tion. 
Plaintiff has provided no expert testimony. Summary 
Judgment was appropriately granted and should be affirmed. 
DATED this otty^day of January, 1989. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
WILLIAM w7 BARRETT 
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ADDENDOM NO. 1 
PA V-55 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY., STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
HOSPITAL, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case Number:CV 87-206 
RULING 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and all 
parties have filed memo of points and authorities in support of 
their respective positions. The court having carefully considered 
the motions and the accompanying memo, and having heard oral 
argument, now enters its: 
RULING 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are well taken 
and are hereby granted. 
The motions are based on two grounds: First the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply here; second, there 
is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the 
establishment of evidentiary foundation. The elements of the 
evidentiary foundation are: (1) the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing 
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant(s), and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by plaintiff, 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 352-53 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed 
that plaintiff, nor defendant(s), cannot identify the offending 
instrumentality to say nothing of management or control thereof. 
In addition, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff 
is required to produce expert medical testimony, except in 
exceptional cases (of which this may be one if an instrumentality 
could be found) to establish that the outcome was more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and has 
failed to produce expert medical testimony, and since this is not 
an exceptional case, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Even 
assuming the jury would infer negligence by some body, if they 
believe that plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the 
hospital, the failure to show what instrumentality caused the 
09f 
burn, and which defendant(s) controlled that instrumentality 
would still leave us without any specific culpable party or 
parties. Therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur in this 
matter is inappropriate. 
The failure to show what caused the injury also 
precludes maintaining an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted. 
DATED in Provo, Utah this_f day of August, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 2 
tS88 WG 18 W & K 
F HU'Sl'.CLlRH 
Charles W. Dahlquist (0798) 
Sherene T. Dillon (4820) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC. 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D., KENT R. 
GAMMETTE, M.D., PROVO OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, and JAMES 
P. SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 87-206 
Judge George E. Ballif 
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the 
plaintiff's Motion in Limine having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable George E. Ballif, the plaintiff being represented 
by S. Rex Lewis; defendant James P. Southwick, M.D. being 
represented by attorney Elizabeth King Brennan; defendants Dr. 
Howard R. Francis, M.D. and Kent R. Gammette, M.D. and Provo 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic being represented by William W. 
Barrett; and defendants Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc. being represented by Charles W, Dahlquist, 
II, the Court having heard full argument on the motions pending 
and, in addition, having reviewed, in camera, the records of a 
subsequent patient at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center whom 
the plaintiff had claimed received a burn on the leg in a 
similar manner, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant 
to the Ruling of the Court dated August 1, 1988, the Motions for 
Summary Judgment of each of the defendants is hereby granted, 
the plaintiff1s Motion in Limine is denied, and this matter is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants, the 
parties to bear their own respective costs. 
DATED this / 1 ' day of August, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
v^^> 
SORGE^ BALL IF 
District Judge 
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